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Abstract: What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper 
identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization 
and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, 
across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform 
measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main 
obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may 
lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de 
jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a 
fundamental role in the reform’s implementation phase.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Starting in the 1990s and continuing in the first decade of the 21st century, the processes of 
democratization and of financial liberalization have both accelerated at the world level. In 
light of the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2007, one pressing issue is 
whether the crisis could determine a slowdown or even a reversal in the process of financial 
liberalization around the world, and especially in emerging economies. Previous literature has 
indeed found a significant adverse impact on financial reform coming from recessions and 
banking crises (Abiad and Mody, 2005) and financial reform experienced a “great reversal” in 
the aftermath of the great depression of the 1930s.  
The political dimension of financial reform has been emphasized in the literature. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbent firms may block, or even reverse, financial 
reform as financial development improves the conditions for entry of new firms and thus 
increase competition, challenging rents of the incumbents. Incumbents can in turn form 
blocking elites and pressure governments to retard or reverse financial reform. Full-fledged 
democracy might be an antidote to the power of blocking elites, as under full democracy 
governments are accountable to the population as a whole. Less clear is what happens away 
from full-fledged democracy. Is the power of blocking elites linearly increasing, or there 
could be a non-linear relationship between degree of democracy and power of economic 
elites? Is it conceivable that the power of economic elites reaches its peak in intermediate 
regimes, regimes of “partial democracy”, in which economic elites “capture” the government? 
By contrast, in autocracies, political elites may have greater power than economic elites and 
thus may implement financial reforms if these increase their chances to maintain (or increase) 
their political power. 
Therefore, away from full democracy, democratization may in fact slow down or even 
reverse economic reforms. We find strong evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
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democracy and financial reform, which suggests that the lowest level of financial reform 
tends to occur in intermediate regimes of “partial democracy”. The non-linearity implies also 
that during the democratization process, as the system travels from autocracy to partial 
democracy, financial reform is likely to go through reversals (Figure 1.) The focus of this 
paper is on this non-linear relationship.  
When these non-linearities hold, the effects of political regime changes on financial 
reforms depend crucially on initial conditions. Yet cross-country analyses involving countries 
with highly heterogeneous starting points may generate misleading results. We tackle this 
identification problem by choosing a specific set of countries, the transition countries of 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. These countries provide a unique natural 
experiment situation. The variation in the level and type of political competition across these 
countries in the starting point of the sample, early 1989, is minimal and the same can be said 
of financial liberalization. Following such common initial conditions, the sample displays 
significant variation in both political and financial variables over 1989-2005 as these  
followed radically different economic and political trajectories (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, it brings to light strong 
evidence for an “unconditional” non-linear association between economic and political 
reforms. This obtains using different measures of the two reforms, over time, across countries 
and in a panel setting.  Secondly, it provides a novel explanation, which is based on a three-
regime model that emphasizes the risks that along autocracy-democracy transitions countries 
can get stuck in an equilibrium with incomplete democracy and incomplete economic 
reforms. Elite heterogeneity is a key feature of the analysis. Elite heterogeneity has been at the 
center of political economy models of historical political changes, such as the voluntary 
extension of the suffrage in nineteen century England (Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Much less 
attention, to our knowledge, has received the relevance of elite heterogeneity for the 
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relationship between economic reforms and political regimes. Thirdly, it presents econometric 
evidence incorporating this U-shaped relationship into the Abiad-Mody 2005 model of 
financial reform. This strengthens the U-shaped relation (it provides “conditional” support to 
this finding) and it improves the fit of this model as the estimates of the other variables turn 
out to be significantly more precise (once the non-linearity is accounted for). Fourthly and 
finally, this is the first papers to our knowledge to estimate an econometric model that 
specifies de jure financial liberalization as an input to de facto financial liberalization. 
Political reforms still have a non-linear effect on de facto financial reform even after 
controlling for the role of de jure measures. This suggests that the political regime plays a 
fundamental role in the implementation and enforcement of legislation rather than solely on 
the legislation itself. 1 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the data set and different measures of 
political and financial liberalizations are presented in order to assist in the search for the 
stylized facts. The main fact that emerges from this is the non-linear relationship between 
political and financial reforms. Section 3 discusses analytical issues and throws light on the 
conditions under which a country falls into a “reversals trap,” that is, a situation in which not 
only political and economic liberalization co-exist, but reinforce each other. Section 4 
discusses the econometric evidence for the U-shaped relation between political and financial 
reforms and argues that this relationship holds across countries, over time, in a panel setting 
as well as within the Abiad-Mody model of financial reform dynamics. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Political and Financial Reforms: In search of the stylized facts 
This section presents the data put together to identify the stylized facts of the relationship 
                                                 
1
 Although in this paper we stress the de jure vs. de facto differences in terms of financial 
liberalization, we also note that recent studies contrast de facto to de jure political reform (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006). Our empirical analysis distinguishes between these two aspects but find that the 
differences are not strong enough to affect our results. 
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between financial and political reforms. We construct objective and replicable indicators of 
financial liberalization as well as of political reform for a yearly panel of 26 countries from 
1989 to 2005, using as wide an array of indicators as possible so as to reflect the multi-faceted 
nature of these two processes.  
We first discuss the indicators used to capture the various dimensions of financial 
reforms (see Levine, 2005). In particular, we try to account for both the size of the financial 
sector and its efficiency (the latter is the favoured measure while the former is the measure 
that has been used more widely.) We thus construct indicators for each of these dimensions. 
 The indicator of financial sector depth is based on three components: the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP, and the ratio of 
commercial and Central bank assets to GDP.2 In order to combine these variables into a single 
indicator, we normalize them by equating the maximum (for all countries and years) of each 
component to one. We calculate the distance from each country-year data point to the global 
maximum (normalized to one) by (a) subtracting each country-year data point from the 
overall minimum (by overall we mean for all countries and all years), (b) calculating the 
range for each series (that is, maximum minus minimum), and (c) dividing the results from (a) 
by those from (b). Notice that this normalization is used for the political and economic 
(financial) reforms measures. In our view, this is superior to alternatives that use a subjective 
yardstick because, inter alia, there are a few countries in the last years of the sample (the new 
European Union members) that completed economic and political reforms and that are 
considered full-fledged market economies and liberal democracies.  
 The index of financial sector efficiency is based on two variables, obtained from the 
BankScope database. The first is the ratio of the bank overhead costs to total assets. The 
second is the net interest margin which is the bank net interest revenue as a share of its 
                                                 
2 Data are from the electronic version of the IMF's International Financial Statistics.  
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interest-bearing assets. Because in the two cases, larger values indicate less competition and 
“less reform,” for consistency in step (a) of the normalization described above we subtract 
each country-year data point from the overall maximum.  
We argue that the index of financial efficiency is preferable to the index that captures 
the depth of the financial sector. For the sake of space, we report a direct comparison of the 
two indexes only in the regression analysis below. 
 Let us turn to the measures of political liberalization. The aim was again to put 
forward various measures capturing different aspects of political reform. The first measure is 
political rights from The Freedom House. This variable is coded in a 1 to 7 scale (with 1 
indicating highest level of political rights and 7 the lowest level of political rights) and covers 
three main areas: the electoral process, political participation, and the functioning of the 
government. The Freedom House civil liberties measure uses the same scale and reflects 
freedom of expression and association, organizational rights, rule of law and individual rights.  
Notice that in the cases of political rights and civil liberties, higher values indicate less rights 
and liberties. We collected another, finer, democracy variable from the Nations in Transit 
report also published by Freedom House. The Nations in Transit democracy variable is coded 
in a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 highest and 7 lowest) and reflects four dimensions: the electoral 
process, civil society, independent media and governance. Finally, we also examine a measure 
of de jure presidential powers, the Presidential Power Index.3   
 We generate a composite index of political reform, using the same normalization 
applied to the financial reform measures, and combining Freedom House’s Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights, Nations in Transit Democracy and the Presidential Power Index. In similar 
fashion, we conduct the analysis using both the index and its individual components. Figure 2 
                                                 
3
  The index is based on whether 29 powers are established by the constitution and coded as follows: 1 
– if the president holds exclusively a given power; 0.5 – if the president is sharing a power with 
another body; and 0 – if the president does not hold the power under question. The data are from 
Careja et al. (2006). 
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shows the average over time for each component for each country, while Figure 3 shows the 
time-series behaviour of the composite index of political reform.  
Figure 2 shows evidence of the presence of a U-shaped relationship across countries 
between political and financial reforms.4 Figure 3 highlights the considerable time-series 
variation in the indicators of financial liberalization and political reforms. Moreover, reversals 
are plentiful for both indicators.  
Figure 3 presents three selected examples. The first is Poland where the financial 
reform index (in the vertical axis) increases from 1989 to 1992, then shows a small decrease 
until 1996, and then a further increase until the year 2005. The second panel in Figure 3 is for 
Russia and shows a rather different trajectory over this 15-year period: financial efficiency 
decreases from 1991 until 1995 and then increases without reversals until 2005. The third and 
last panel shows the experience of Uzbekistan, a case in which this index reveals a constant 
deterioration of financial efficiency from 1991 to 2005, with only the period 2000 to 2004 
showing signs of relative improvements (which were wiped out from 2004 to 2005). Political 
reform in Poland peaked between 1990 and 1997, with relative levels of political 
liberalization declining until the end of the sample. In the case of Russia, the data reveals that 
relative political reform declines continuously from 1991 to 1993, and then again from 1997 
to 2005. Finally, Uzbekistan seems to have achieved its maximum level of political 
liberalization in year 1991.  
 Figure 4 focus on reform reversals. For comparability, the two reform indices are 
normalized to 0-1 and re-scaled so that higher values reflect more reform. We define reform 
as the changes in levels of the two indicators (first-differences), measured on a year-to-year 
                                                 
4
 Data on financial reform is available for all transition economies, except for Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. Guergen et al. (1999) note that both countries have announced widespread financial 
reform packages in 1997-1998. Political reform, on the other hand, is still extremely restricted in 
Tajikistan until today and was so in Turkmenistan until the death of President Niyazov in late 2006. 
Our feeling is that if we could incorporate these two countries to our analysis, it would much 
strengthen our results. This is because according to the limited available information, we would place 
the two countries just below Uzbekistan.    
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basis. We associate a reversal to the case when the value of this change is negative. Using this 
definition,  based on the 337 country-year cells for which data on the two reforms is available, 
we identify political reform reversals in 48% of the cases, we detect financial reform reversals 
in 35% of the cells, and joint political and financial reform (“twin”) reversals in 17% of all 
possible cases.  
As it can be seen in Figure 4, reversals in political or in financial reforms are detected 
in every single country in the sample. Moreover, in only 4 countries we do not observe joint 
reversals (namely, Estonia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Romania.)   
Regarding the size of reform reversals and keeping in mind that both reform indices 
are on a 0 to 1 scale, the magnitude of the average change is 0.008 (for political reform) and 
0.02 (for financial reform) with respective standard deviations of 0.09 and 0.07. In terms of 
ranges, the largest advance in a single year in financial reform (0.56) was for Croatia towards 
the end of the war in 1994 and in terms of political reform, the largest increase (0.77) was for 
Czechoslovakia in 1990. We find the largest reversal in a single year in terms of financial 
reform was for Russia in 1995 (-0.34) while in terms of political reform it is observed for 
Tajikistan in 1992 (-0.33). These suggest that reversals are more common than previously 
thought and that they tend to be rather severe. Reversals are at the root of the non-linear 
relationship among structural reforms. 
 
3. Non-linearity and reversals: Analytical issues 
A non-monotonic relationship between economic and political liberalization requires the 
presence of at least three political regimes.5 The introduction of a regime of partial 
democracy, an intermediate regime between autocracy and full-fledged democracy, is the key 
                                                 
5
 The Appendix provides a formal and more technical discussion of these ideas. 
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element of the non-monotonicity.6 Only in a full-fledged democracy, the majority of the 
population determines the decisions of the government. Away from full-fledged democracy, 
economic elites exert a dominant power. Traditionally, autocracy has been defined as the 
regime in which the elites have the absolute political power. However, non-democratic 
regimes may be highly heterogeneous. Heterogeneity may characterize both the distinction 
between political and economic elites and the distinction between different economic elites. 
This heterogeneity allows the presence of multiple non-democratic political equilibria. Until 
recently, elite heterogeneity has received little attention in the political economy literature. 
One reason might be the difficulty in reaching general conlusions in models with 
heterogeneous elite. Indeed, in such a case political-economy equilibria depend on the 
specific nature of heterogeneity and on the specific dimensions of the political contest and 
economic reform areas.  
These difficulties notwithstanding, elite heterogeneity plays a fundamental role in 
studies of the voluntary extension of voting rights in nineteen century England (Lizzeri and 
Persico 2004). Lizzeri and Persico identify a clear distinction of interests between commercial 
and urban classes, as opposed to land owners. In their model, elite heterogeneity helps to 
explain the extension of the suffrage to poorer classes and thus a process of democratization. 
By contrast, in this paper we argue that elite heterogeneity may help to explain the emergence 
of an equilibrium with autocracy and economic reform. Elite heterogeneity plays an important 
role also in Acemoglu (2008), who analyzes the emergence of coalitions between the poor 
population and the backward (low-skilled) elites. This approach is closer to ours, as we 
analyze possible equilibria in which some elites form a coalition with the population in order 
to support a strong autocratic government that opposes the interests of other elites. In contrast 
                                                 
6
  We exclude cases of military dictatorship and repression, and focus on regimes based on universal 
voting rights and elected governments. This assumption implies that all regimes can be considered de 
jure democracies, defined as systems based on universal voting rights.  
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to Acemoglu, we explore the possibility of emergence of a coalition between reform-oriented 
elites and the population to support a strong government capable to resist the pressures for 
blocking reforms by other elites. Such coalition may support an autocratic government, in 
which an independent political elite retains the power. By contrast, we define partial 
democracy as a regime in which the government is fully captured by economic elites. The 
objectives and constraints of the government in the two non-democratic regimes are sharply 
different. A strong autocratic government needs support in order to maintain its power. This 
support comes both from some elites and from the population. The preferences of the 
supporting elites and the population have to be taken into account by the autocratic 
government. By contrast, in partial democracy, the economic elites fully control the 
government. Therefore, the preferences of the dominant elites are the only ones that are taken 
into account in the decision making. This is the reason why this regime has been defined as 
“captured democracy” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).7   
The definitions of the three political regimes are relevant to define the nature of policy 
reversals. We can indeed define a threshold level for an intermediate regime. To the right- 
hand-side of this threshold, there is a region in which economic elites interfere with the 
political system and fully control the political process.8 Moving left and crossing the 
threshold, there is a region in which the State may regain power against the economic elites 
by strengthening the position of the political elites. In this region, the political system relies 
on a coalition between some elites and the population. Therefore, depending on the relative 
position with respect to the threshold, a lower level of democracy may reflect two different 
                                                 
7
 The following quote from Epstein et al. (2006) effectively summarizes the relevance of partial 
democracy: “We also learn that the frontier of this line of inquiry has shifted away from the study of 
autocracies and democracies and toward the study of partial democracies. As we show here, the 
behavior of these systems largely determines the level, rate, and properties of democratization. While 
thus influential, partial democracies, being highly heterogeneous, are poorly understood. The study of 
democratization, we therefore conclude, should place them at its focus” (p. 552).   
8
 This is the region that Rajan and Zingales (2003) have studied in connection with the role of interest 
groups in opposing financial development. 
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configurations of power of economic elites (Figure 1).  
As the protection of positions of monopoly rights by economic elites is the main 
barrier to economic liberalization (Parente and Prescott, 2002), the relationship between 
power of economic elites and reform is linear and negative. However, the relationship 
between the extent of democracy and power of economic elites is non-linear, and this is why 
the relationship between political and economic liberalizations is non-linear.9  
In summary, the non-monotonicity between political regime and economic reforms 
arises because the power of interest groups may be weakened either in a full-fledged 
democracy or in a more autocratic regime. To maintain their power, autocratic governments 
may favour efficiency enhancing reforms because these will increase consensus in the 
population and, at the same time, the resources at disposal of the political regime to buy such 
consensus. Such efficiency enhancing reforms may favour as well certain economic elites, 
which participate in a coalition with the population to support the autocratic government. 
Lacking support by some economic elites, the autocratic government will be overthrown by 
opposing elites. Heterogeneity of elites is a distinguishing feature of our analysis and helps to 
explain why autocratic governments tend to implement fundamental economic reforms 
concentrated in specific areas, rather than ranging over a broad spectrum as in democracy.10  
The financial sector is one of the areas in which autocratic governments have carried out 
significant reforms. 
  Although it is likely that there is a positive correlation between different economic 
reforms, such correlation is far from perfect. In fact, in autocracy, and even more in the 
intermediate region of partial democracy, there may be less convergence between different 
                                                 
9
 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) developed a framework that may explain the non-monotonic 
relationship between political regimes and technological and institutional change.  
10
  Our approach has also some similarities with Rajan (2009), although our characterization of 
different political regimes is different. 
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areas of reforms.11 Economic elites may block reforms in specific areas, whereas reforms can 
proceed in areas where there are not strong vested interests.12 The functioning of the financial 
sectors may affect asymmetrically different elites. The presence of heterogeneous elites seems 
to be a useful assumption to understand the political economy of financial sector reform. 
We see the link between the financial sector and political reforms working through 
two distinct channels. One can be thought as the defence of rent-seeking through barriers to 
financial development (in line with Rajan and Zingales, 2003). One elite benefits directly 
from blocking financial sector development. The other channel has to do with government 
revenues, as financial repression can be an important way for the state to raise revenue.13  
While one elite benefits from financial repression, the other elite and the population 
are negatively affected. The elites controlling financial institutions have a direct interest in 
expanding their activities. Similarly, large manufacturing firms may need significant external 
finance and thus a developed financial sector. Finally, when the banking system is controlled 
by the State, political elites can use the banking sector as a powerful economic lever in their 
own interest. 
 From the above, it is apparent that we expect financial sector development to be faster 
(ceteris paribus) in dictatorships than in partial democracies. Both autocratic and democratic 
governments tend to foster financial development. Reversals in financial liberalization, 
however, are more likely in the transition from an autocratic regime towards a more 
democratic regime. Full-fledged democracy seems to be the best antidote against reversals. 
However, power groups may gain strength even in democracy and push for reversals of 
                                                 
11
 For instance in Russia, during the shift towards more authoritarian government under Putin, 
financial sector reform improved markedly, while competition policy stalled and large scale 
privatization reversed as a result of major re-nationalizations. Braga de Macedo and Olivera Martins 
(2008) analyze the complementarity of reforms. 
12
 This phenomenon may be reinforced by external pressures arising from increased international 
integration of the economy. With economic integration there is less scope for barriers to reform and 
thus protection of monopoly rents tend to be concentrated in a smaller set of sectors. 
13
 High reserve requirements or ceilings on deposit rates increase bank margins and thus taxable 
income from banks. 
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financial sector reform, in order to create barriers to entry and protect their monopoly 
positions as incumbents (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Furthermore, the nature of financial 
sector reform in dictatorships is likely to be different from the one in democracies. Rather 
than financial reform geared towards increasing competition in the system, dictatorship may 
aim instead at financial sector reforms that increase the power and the revenue of political 
elites in the economy.14   
 
4. Econometric Evidence on the Relationship between Political and Financial Reforms  
This section discusses econometric results trying to establish and evaluate the empirical 
existence and robustness of a non-linear relationship between political and economic 
(financial) liberalizations. It encompasses four main parts: (1)  the “between” panel estimates 
focusing on the simple, bivariate, relationship between political and financial liberalization, 
(2) the fixed-effects estimates focusing on the cross-country, over time relationship between 
the two reforms, (3)  a structural model of the determinants of financial liberalization (Abiad 
and Mody, 2005), and (4) instrumental variables panel estimates accounting for the 
relationship between de jure and de facto dimensions of financial liberalization.   
 
4.1 Between Estimates 
This section investigates the extent and depth of empirical support for the often neglected fact 
that the relationship between economic and political liberalization follows a U-shaped pattern. 
This is done, firstly, by focusing on the simple averages over the whole period for each 
country (that is, the “between” panel estimates).  
  Figure 2 displays the results from the “between” panel estimates. These are obtained 
                                                 
14
 An interesting area for future research is the analysis of the different nature of financial sector 
development in connection with democracy, economic opportunity and more open societies. Recent 
work in the finance literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007) has emphasized the importance of 
the formal financial system in affecting "the degree to which economic opportunities are defined by 
talent rather than by parental wealth and social connections. 
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by regressing the various measures of political reform on the preferred measure of financial 
reform (the one reflecting efficiency, not depth or size of the financial sector). More 
specifically, Figures 2 plots the predicted and actual values from regressions of the country 
average political rights on linear and quadratic terms of our index of financial efficiency. The 
fit of the quadratic specification is better than that of the linear for every measure of political 
reform. As it can be seen in Figure 2, the relationship between financial reform and political 
reform is clearly U-shaped.15  
The figure also shows each country in the economic and political reform space. It is 
important to keep in mind that the figure has averages over the whole period for which data is 
available (it generally starts in 1989 for Central European and in 1991 for former Soviet 
Union countries) and that data is missing for countries such as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 
which tend to score high in financial development and low in political.16 It can be seen that 
countries such as the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary have high levels of financial 
and political reform, while at the other extreme for countries such as Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia it shows high average levels of financial reform but little in terms of political 
liberalization. In between, there are countries that have made limited progress on each of the 
two reforms, with some having made more inroads in political than in economic reforms (e.g., 
Romania and Georgia) and others that made relatively more progress in terms of economic 
than in terms of political reforms (e.g., Albania and Russia). 
 These averages present a reassuring picture and are a good start, yet they may be 
concealing some important differences. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, examining the 
progress in political and economic reforms of each country over time shows that reversals do 
not seem at all scarce. They are also not restricted to a specific reform: reversals tend to occur 
                                                 
15
 Notice that this obtains for the whole range of political reform measures, that is, for the cases of 
civil liberties, political rights, two democracy indexes, and press freedom.   
16
  We have also estimated the regressions below without Uzbekistan in order to check whether this 
country was solely responsible for the U-shaped relationship and we find that the results are not at all 
affected.  
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in both political and financial reforms. Further, political reversals seem to be related to 
reversals in financial reform albeit there are obvious differences in terms of their intensities. 
For example, in the case of Poland and Russia, political reversals seem to be larger than the 
economic reversals, while for Uzbekistan the opposite seems to be the case. Although such 
graphs generate various insights, we need further and systematic econometric evidence to be 
reassured about the importance of reversals and non-linearities.   
 
4.2 Fixed-Effects Estimates 
Table 1 presents fixed-effects panel estimates for the relationship between political and 
financial reforms. As noted, we run the opposite specification from that underlying Figure 4, 
with financial reform now in the left-hand side. The first five columns of Table 1 report the 
results for each of the components of the two indexes of financial reform (namely, depth and 
efficiency, or index 1 and index 2 in the Table). Columns 1 to 3 show the results for the 
components of Index 1 (financial depth), columns 4 and 5 show the results for the 
components of Index 2 (financial efficiency), while columns 6 and 7 show the results for 
Index 1 and Index 2 as the dependent variables.  
In interpreting the results, notice that the original components of political and of 
economic reforms were not re-scaled.17 Thus, these results suggest that there is a non-linear 
relation between political and financial reform and that this relation is U-shaped: democracy 
first decreases and then increases with financial reform (indeed, this occurs irrespective of 
which financial reform index we may concentrate on or of which individual component of any 
of the two financial reform indexes).     
 These econometric results are equally strong for civil liberties and for the Nations in 
Transit’s democracy index as they are for press freedom. For these three aspects of political 
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 This is also one way of seeing that this normalization is not artificially “creating” this U-shaped 
relation.  
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liberalization, a strong U-shaped relationship emerges whether we focus on any of the 
aggregate financial reform indexes or on any of their five individual components. The results 
for the presidential power index and for political rights are somewhat not as strong. For the 
presidential power index, the U-shape relationship obtains only for the case of the Index 2 of 
financial reform, the one capturing efficiency. For political rights, the U-shaped relationship 
actually obtains for the two aggregate financial reform indexes, but it is weaker for index 1 
than for Index 2 as it fails to obtain for the first two individual components of index 1. This 
should not be a major concern because they all occur with respect to index 1, which is not the 
preferred measure of financial reform as explained above.  
   
4.3 Reform Reversals in the Abiad-Mody Model 
 A critic may argue that the results above only support an “unconditional U-shaped” 
relationship between political and economic reform reversals. “Unconditional” because it 
does not depend on any other potentially important explanatory variable. Yet one concern is 
that the omission of other important determinants of any of the two reforms may bias these 
results. In order to minimize this concern, we selected the seminal econometric model of the 
determinants of financial liberalization to ask what would be the consequences of enlarging it 
with political reform.   
 The main objective of Abiad and Mody (2005) is two-fold: to create an index of 
financial liberalization across countries and over time, and to study how different political 
economy theories of reform succeed in explaining the dynamics of such indicator. 18 
Their financial liberalization index is constructed for 35 (developing and developed) 
countries, annually from 1973 to 1996. The components of their Financial Liberalization 
Index are as follows: credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers in banking, 
                                                 
18
  Notice that their sample does not include any transition economy so unfortunately there is no 
overlap between their sample and ours. 
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operational restriction on banks (e.g. branching regulations), privatization, and restrictions on 
international financial transactions (e.g., multiple exchange rates.) For each dimension in each 
year, a country receives a score on a graded scale, with zero being “fully financially 
repressed,” one “partially repressed,” two “largely liberalized” and three “fully liberalized.” 
Theirs is a de jure type of measure, while ours is a de facto measure of reform.19  
 The empirical model from Abiad and Mody (2005) nests the main hypothesis from the 
political economy of reform literature. They argue that the various determinants of reform fall 
into the following categories: (a) shocks such as crises of various types; (b) learning about the 
effects of previous reforms, (c) ideology of those in charge of setting the agenda, negotiating 
political support and implementation, and (d) the political and economic structures which 
conditions the decision to embark in a given reform programme. 
 Their baseline econometric specification has financial reform as a function of a 
learning term reflecting the initial level of reform and the convergence effect between actual 
and desired level of reform. Moreover, Abiad and Mody (2005) also include various factors to 
reflect the role of shocks, namely balance-of-payment crises, banking crises, recessions and 
high-inflation periods. The influence of international financial institutions is assessed through 
a dummy variable for participation in an IMF program and that of global factors is proxied by 
the U.S. interest rate. For the political orientation of the government, they include dummy 
variables for left-wing and right-wing governments (“center” being the omitted category).  
The political and economic structured is proxied by the degree of trade openness of the 
economy.  
 In this paper, we tried to replicate their model as closely as possible. We collected data 
on all the explanatory variables in Abiad and Mody and measure them in exactly the same 
                                                 
19
 This is a crucial distinction in the financial liberalization literature (Kose et al, 2009). The next sub-
section investigates how these two de jure and de facto dimensions relate and whether their 
relationship affects the finding of a non-linear relationship between economic and political reforms. 
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way as they did. There are only three small differences. They include a dummy variable for 
the political honeymoon period, the first year of a new government in office. During this 
period, the implementation of painful reforms is said to be easier because the newly elected 
government has political capital to spend. We could not include this variable in our 
specifications because, unsurprisingly, it turned out to be correlated with our political reform 
index. The second change was that Abiad and Mody also add a regional element to their 
learning story (i.e., countries learn about reform from their regional “neighbours.”) In our 
case, all countries are from the same region so in our model learning only takes place over 
time (that is, it does not happen at different speeds within different regions.) The third and last 
change is that instead of trade openness we use an index of external liberalization and also 
allows us also to throw some light on the relationship between different economic reforms.  
 Abiad and Mody find that while banking crises hinder financial reform, balance-of-
payment crises foster it. They find the initial level of reform matters. Declines in global 
interest rates exert a positive effect on domestic financial liberalization, but there is little 
evidence to suggest that recessions and high-inflation episodes are systematically associated 
with financial liberalization. Similar conclusions are reached with respect to participation in 
an IMF program. Finally, there is little evidence for the honeymoon political effect, for 
whether the government is left or right-wing and for the role of trade openness.  
Table 2 presents our estimates of the Abiad-Mody model of the determinants of 
financial reform. First we report the tobit panel estimator because our financial reform index 
(the left-hand side variable) is constrained to the 0 to 1 interval. We report results for our 
financial efficiency index and our overall political reform index. In order to minimize 
concerns about reverse causality, we lagged all variables by one-period (except political 
reforms, although we find that also lagging these makes the estimates even more precise.)  
As it can be seen in Table 2, our findings are similar to those from Abiad and Mody 
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(2005). Debt crises help financial reform, while banking crises hinder it. Lower U.S. interest 
rates boost domestic financial reform, while recessions and high-inflation show a systematic 
negative effect on financial reform. The results also show that the coefficients on IMF 
program, left-wing and right-wing are not statistically significant different from zero. Yet the 
more important result from Table 2 is that the two terms for political reform are significant 
throughout and carry the expected signs. Thus, the result shows that the relationship between 
financial and political reforms is indeed U-shaped.  
  Table 3 uses the same specifications but now for the fixed-effects panel estimator. As 
it can be seen, there is no change in the main conclusions. We replicate Abiad and Mody main 
findings and show that incorporating political reform is important to improve the predictive 
power of the model.  
 Table 4 brings some very important differences. Chiefly among them is that now the  
left-hand side variable is change in the levels of reform (that is, the first-differences of the 
financial reform index). Moreover, we now cluster the standard errors at the country level in 
order to account for country-specific errors. As it can be seen, the results are slightly worse 
than above in that a few of the variables loose statistical significance (although most of the 
signs are still consistent). Among the results which remain, debt crisis spurs while recession 
dampens financial reform. Interestingly, left-wing governments are, ceteris paribus, more 
likely to implement financial reforms than right-wing and centre governments. More 
importantly, political reform is still a powerful variable explaining the evolution of financial 
reform across countries and over time, and that this relationship seems indeed to be U-shaped.  
The estimates in Table 4 are our preferred estimates. GMM estimates have been used 
widely but criticized heavily recently, inter alia, because of the somewhat mechanic process 
of selecting instruments. Table 5 report standard GMM estimates of the same specifications as 
before as an additional robustness check. As it can be seen, the support for the hypothesized 
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relationship between political and financial reforms is unabated. The GMM results also 
support the contrasting effects of banking and debt crises, the negative effects of U.S. interest 
rates, high-inflation and recessions, and the role of left- and right-wing governments.   
   
4.4 Instrumental Variables Estimates of De Jure and De Facto Financial Liberalization 
This sub-section presents another way of assessing the robustness of the non-linear 
relationship between political and economic liberalizations. One of the central distinctions in 
the literature on financial liberalization is that between de jure and de facto measures (Kose et 
al, 2009). De jure measures reflect changes in the legal framework, laws, rules and 
regulations that affect the financial system, while de facto indexes capture the size and actual 
workings of the financial system. The index developed and used above is therefore a de facto 
index, while Abiad and Mody’s is a de jure measure. Kose et al. (2009) argue that many 
discrepancies in the literature on the impacts of financial liberalization can be traced back to 
this distinction.  
One natural extension would be then to ask whether the results hold if instead of de 
facto we use de jure measures. However, instead of just substituting different types of 
measures, we investigate an issue that has been largely unexplored, namely how de jure 
affects de facto liberalization. This issue can be thought of in a production function 
framework. Specifically, de facto financial liberalization may be driven by two components: 
one is changes in laws and regulation (inputs) and the other is changes in the quality of the 
enforcement of these laws (“technology”). The question in this sub-section is whether the 
non-linear relationship between political and economic (financial and de facto) liberalizations 
obtains  even once the role of the legal inputs is taken into account in this process. 
The original index by Abiad and Mody (2005) has been updated by Abiad et al. (2008) 
and extended to many more developed and developing countries, 16 of which are in our 
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sample. The revised Financial Liberalization Index captures seven factors: (a) capital account 
restrictions, (b)  interest rate controls, (c) competition (entry barriers in banking), (d) banking 
supervision, (e) privatization (and state involvement in the financial system), (f) capital flows 
restrictions, and (g) policies to develop securities in stock markets. One main source of data is 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Table 6 presents instrumental variable estimates using these data. Panel A of Table 6 
contains the second-stage regression in which changes in the de facto measure of financial 
liberalization is regressed on, as before, lagged level of de facto liberalization, linear and 
square terms for political liberalization and, now added, the variables reflecting Abiad et al.’s 
financial liberalization reforms. The latter enter one-by-one (results for each of the seven 
components are presented). Columns 1 to 7 contain each one of the seven components 
described above, while column 8 contains the results for the aggregate de jure index of 
financial liberalization. Panel B at the bottom of Table 6 contains the first stage results for the 
de jure measures, using the Abiad and Mody specification as in section 4.3. For example, 
column 1 in panel B shows the first-stage results for capital controls as the endogenous 
variable: column 1 shows our IV results for the case in which capital controls enters the de 
facto reform equation (Panel A), with capital controls instrumented using  the original Abiad 
and Mody model (Panel B).   
As expected, the variables in the Abiad and Mody model as a whole are strong 
predictors of the inputs or de jure measures of financial liberalization. Table 6 reports the F 
statistic for the excluded regressors, that is significant in all cases. The Hansen’s J statistic 
according to which the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, uncorrelated with the 
residuals and thus correctly excluded from the second stage regression is also supportive. 
There are four main results from Table 6. The first is that there is further corroborating 
evidence for a non-linear relationship between political and economic reforms. The two 
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coefficients on political reform, linear and square, are statistically significant in all but one 
case (column 7, for the stock market policies component). Moreover, their magnitude is 
strikingly similar to that obtained in the preferred estimates from section 4.3.   
The second important result is that the exogenous component of the de jure financial 
liberalization index is a strong predictor of de facto financial liberalization in all cases but one 
(namely, competition policies in the banking sector.) This suggests that actual financial 
liberalization seldom takes place without first a change in the relevant laws and regulations.20  
The third important result is related to this last one: political reform has a first-order, 
direct impact on de facto financial liberalization and, more importantly, there is no evidence 
of any confounding indirect effect of political reforms on actual financial liberalization 
through changes in the laws and regulations that govern the financial sector.  Our evidence 
shows that the main role of political reforms is to affect the enforcement of those regulations, 
and not the regulations themselves.  
The fourth important result is that the Abiad and Mody model seems to work much 
better for explaining de facto (as discussed in section 4.3) than de jure liberalization (Panel B 
of Table 6). For instance, it is difficult to find a single variable in the Panel B of Table 6 that 
shows a consistent effect across columns 1 to 8, with the sole exception of trade liberalization. 
In the case of debt crisis, depending on the component of de jure liberalization, it can have a 
statistically significant, positive or negative impact.  
In summary, we find that there is strong evidence for a U-shaped relationship between 
political and economic reform in our data. This result is very robust. We have used a wide 
array of estimators, a strong identification strategy, and various measures of the two reforms. 
Our basic finding successfully goes through all of these checks. 
                                                 
20
 We stress that to understand the dynamics of actual financial liberalization, in addition to the effects 
from financial reform inputs (de jure indexes), it seems imperative to also take into account political 
reforms.  
 22 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper presents novel theoretical motivation and robust econometric evidence for a non-
linear, U-shaped, relationship between financial liberalization and political reform, which 
stresses the previously neglected yet crucial role played by reform reversals. We believe this 
to be a main contribution of the paper, which is supported by an identification strategy based 
on a selected group of countries, which shared remarkably similar initial conditions, 
characterized by extremely low levels of political and economic liberalization (thus with the 
pre-reform periods acting as control in the analysis of the reform periods). Furthermore, it 
introduces a new perspective on the relationship between de jure and de facto financial 
liberalization. Rather than choosing one of the two measures, we used the de jure 
liberalization as an input for the de facto liberalization. It turned out that political regimes 
play a crucial role in affecting the implementation stage, namely the effectiveness with which 
de jure reforms are transferred into de facto financial liberalization.  
We plan to extend the analysis in three main directions: towards a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the political and of the economic reversals, on how 
complementarity among reforms (or the lack of) affects the occurrence and severity of 
reversals, and we would like to analyze the impact that financial and economic liberalizations 
have on overall economic performance (taking into account the role of reversals in defining 
their joint dynamics). On the nature of reversals, we are interested in assessing whether their 
size and duration systematically vary across political regimes and types of economic reforms. 
We also plan to carry out our analysis for a larger set of economic reforms and study as well 
the complementarity between different reforms. Our conjecture is that different political 
regimes may not only imply different depth of specific reforms but also a different range or 
choice of reforms.    
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Figure 1: Dynamics of political and economic reforms 
 Figure 2 Cross-country evidence 
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Figure 3. Time-series evidence 
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Figure 4  The Occurrence of Reversals across Countries and Over Time: 
Political Reform Reversals, Financial Reform Reversals, and Twin Reversals 
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 Table 1 Panel evidence   
Fixed-Effects Estimates, 1989-2005 
 
  
Panel E 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
Privat 
Credit Bank Assets Bank Overhead Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin Index 1 Index 2 
  /GDP /GDP /GDP / Total Assets  First 3 vars last 2 vars 
NiT Democracy -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.284*** 0.0411*** 0.0419*** -0.291*** -0.253*** 
 [0.040] [0.050] [0.062] [0.0084] [0.011] [0.059] [0.046] 
NiT Democracy square 0.0195*** 0.0200*** 0.0380*** -0.00466*** -0.00472*** 0.0386*** 0.0300*** 
 [0.0051] [0.0065] [0.0078] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0076] [0.0057] 
Constant 0.628*** 0.489*** 1.255*** -0.0186 -0.0167 0.970*** 1.216*** 
 [0.080] [0.090] [0.12] [0.015] [0.020] [0.11] [0.082] 
Observations 170 170 201 197 197 171 207 
Number of country 19 19 23 23 23 19 23 
R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.06 0.16 0.22 
        
Standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
Panel Data Instrumental Variables Estimates  
Endogenous variables are changes in de facto financial reform and de jure financial reform measures 
Standard errors in  brackets and clustered at country level, robust to heteroscedasticity 
(all RHS variables in first-stage lagged one-period, except political reform) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
PANEL A:  Second-stage regressions  
(endogenous variable is changes in de facto financial reform index) 
Financial reform (lag)  -0.17*** -0.145*** -0.116** -0.179*** -0.178*** -0.162*** -0.201*** -0.169*** 
 [0.057] [0.053] [0.046] [0.055] [0.051] [0.053] [0.056] [0.053] 
Political reform -0.374** -0.358** -0.275* -0.378** -0.351** -0.395*** -0.25 -0.337* 
 [0.18] [0.18] [0.15] [0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] 
Political reform squared 0.313** 0.332* 0.201* 0.311* 0.233 0.341** 0.102 0.262* 
 [0.15] [0.17] [0.12] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.13] [0.14] 
De jure financial reform 0.0896* 0.0829** 0.0973 0.0625*** 0.0699*** 0.0623*** 0.114*** 0.0973*** 
 [0.047] [0.038] [0.081] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.039] [0.038] 
PANEL B: First-stage regressions  
(endogenous variable is de jure financial reform measures from Abiad et al., 2008) 
De jure financial reform 
Capital 
controls   
Interest 
rates  
Compe-
tition  
Supervi-
sion  
Privatiza-
tion  
Capital 
flows  Securities  
Fin. Lib 
Index 
Financial reform (lag) 0.111 -.1442 -.354 .076 -.049 .082 .288* -.070 
 [0.152] [.1664] [.279] [.141] [.189] [.194] [.155] [.0831] 
Political reform 0.486 .171 -1.111 .293 .064 .1038 -.648 -.0448 
 [0.757] [1.044] [1.298] [.790] [.946] [.9079] [.586] [.411] 
Political reform squared -0.442 -.655 1.29 -.371 .621 -.264 1.38** .096 
 [0.657] [1.07] [1.016] [.845] [.838] [.7628] [.513] [.324] 
Banking crisis 0.006 .0397 -.076 -.084** -.057 .0055 -.087 -.035 
 [0.044] [.053] [.0603] [.0407] [.068] [.0725] [.059] [.0206] 
Debt crisis  -0.25*** -.224** -.158 .0723 .223*** .095 .106** -.058 
 [0.082] [.095] [.276] [.1201] [.0616] [.0609] [.048] [.097] 
IMF Programme -0.003 .104 *** -.035 .0393 -.007 -.064 .002 .019* 
 [0.021] [.032] [.0205] [.0365] [.0359] [.0417] [.025] [.0106] 
U.S. interest rates   -0.015* .002 -.027 -.022 -.027 -.025* -.0005 -.017** 
 [0.008] [.0102] [.0168] [.0133] [.0162] [.0116] [.011] [.007] 
Recession -0.059* -.014 -.002 -.072 -.197** -.069 -.094* -.066** 
 [0.030] [.0473] [.0519] [.064] [.072] [.0638] [.053] [.027] 
High inflation   -0.042 -.096* -.063 -.131** -.061 .008 .0677 -.081** 
 [0.035] [.0501] [.068] [.057] [.0744] [.0601] [.057] [.033] 
Trade liberalization 0.329*** .437** .0897 .761*** .649*** .797*** .454*** .438*** 
 [0.082] [.2007] [.095] [.1305] [.147] [.158] [.082] [.0506] 
Left-wing government   -0.064 -.0419 .0003 .051 .0673 .178* -.037 .0012 
 [0.044] [.0804] [.0727] [.0601] [.0963] [.087] [.085] [.032] 
Right-wing government   -0.085** -.076 .009 -.075 .0673 .116* .072 -.053 
  [0.037] [.103] [.0647] [.0622] [.0963] [.0617] [.064] [.035] 
F test of excluded  8.240 9.06 5.17 16.12 32.43 39.85 12.59 38.18 
              instruments [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.002] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Hansen J statistic 9.590 6.993 7.902 6.127 4.619 5.578 3.774 5.269 
 [0.295] [0.537] [0.443] [0.633] [0.797] [0.694] [0.8769] [0.7285] 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix:  Modelling the non-linearity 
In this appendix, we present an extremely simple framework to account for the nonlinear 
relationship between political regime and financial reform. The model is a simple extension of 
the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) workhorse model, which focuses on redistributive 
politics. One extension of this model is that we assume that the government, in addition to 
determining tax rates and transfers, also selects the level of financial reform. Financial reform 
produces efficiency gains but at the same time reduces government revenue per unit of output.  
The other extension is given by the presence of heterogeneous elites, associated with 
different sectors of the economy. We assume the economy is composed by two sectors, a 
“modern” sector and a “traditional” sector, for instance a sector based on natural resources or 
traditional technologies. We call capitalists in the former sector as the “modern” elite and the 
owners of the firm in the other sector as “traditional” elite. Workers form the majority of the 
population and are employed in both sectors. Population is formed by Nb, members of the 
“traditional” elite, Ng, members of the “modern” elite, Lm, workers in productive sector, Lo, 
workers in the “traditional sector.”  Total population, N, is normalized to be equal to 1. 
Output in the productive sector can be produced with two technologies, an advanced 
and a traditional one. The advanced technology requires a sufficient level of financial 
development. Thus, output in the productive sector is given by: 
)(),( ZILKFY mm =                for Z ≥ Z*        
or 
mm LY =                                   for Z ≤ Z* 
where Z represents the level of development of the financial sector and with  
I(Z)>1               for Z ≥ Z*.   
Workers earn  )(ZIwm   for  Z ≥ Z*    or   mw    for  Z ≤ Z*. 
In this specification, financial development appears as a public good. The elite and 
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workers in the good sector favour financial development. 
In the “traditional” sector, output is produced by labour and a natural resource R. If 
labour falls below a given threshold, output cannot be extracted in the sector. Therefore, 
owners of natural resources have to pay the same wage as in the productive sector. As a 
result, workers in the natural resource sector benefit as well from financial development. 
However, financial reform reduces government revenues, and in particular those generated by 
financial repression. We define such revenue cost as C(Z). 
Incomes of the different groups are taxed with the same tax rate τ. Income taxes lead 
to inefficiencies, measured by a loss function C(τ) y , with C′(τ)>0, and y  denoting average 
income in the economy. The government uses tax revenues to redistribute income through 
transfers, T in per capita terms, which we assume are the same across groups. In autocracy 
part of the transfers are directly appropriated (or “grabbed”) by the government.  
Given these assumptions, there are three possible equilibria in the model: (i) 
democracy, with the preference of the workers (the majority of the population) determining 
policy outcomes; (ii) autocracy, with a political elite in power that wins a political contest 
against the “traditional” elite. The autocratic government is based on consensus from the 
“modern” elite and from the worker-population; (iii) partial or captured democracy, with the 
“traditional” elite dominating the political scene; such regime is unstable as it has no 
consensus on any parts of the population. 
The worker-population prefers high redistribution of income, thus high tax rates, as its 
income is lower than average income. It also favours financial reform. The “modern” elite has 
a preference for low income taxes and it favours financial reform. The “modern” elite cannot 
form a coalition with the “traditional” elite as its income crucially rests on the presence of 
financial development. However, the “modern” elite is averse to redistribution and thus has a 
preference for an autocratic regime that can deliver financial reform and lower taxation. In 
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contrast, democracy will ensure financial reform but will imply high tax rates. 
Full democracy and partial democracy are relatively easy to characterize, as they 
reflect the preference of the worker-population and of the “traditional” elite, respectively. The 
equilibrium in autocracy is more complex, as the government has two objectives: one, is 
retaining its power, which requires sufficient consensus from the heterogeneous groups; the 
other, is the appropriation of resources (“grabbing hands”). We will characterize three 
different political equilibria, related to different reform policies.  First, we will define the 
objective functions of the four players (government, two elites and the worker-population). 
The indirect utility of the different players are as follows 
Vb = (1- τ)M/N b+T                                                                                                (1)      
for the “traditional” elite (with m= M/Nb  rents per rentier in the natural resource sector). 
Vg=[(1-τ)(1-α)F(K,Lm)I(Z)]/Ng+T                                                                             (2) 
 for the modern elite. 
Vw=[(1-τ)αF(K,Lm)I(Z)(1+Lo)]/(Lm+Lo)+T                                                                (3) 
for the worker-population.    
Assuming that per capita transfers are the same across different population groups, transfers 
are obtained from the government budget constraint: 
T=[τ- C(Z)-C(τ)] y                                                                                                     (4) 
The payoff of the autocrat has two components, one related to the consensus motive, 
which involves the utility of the different parts of the population, and the other to the 
appropriation motive of part of tax revenues: 
Va = µ Vb+(1+ µ)[ Vg+ Vw]+βT                                                                                   (5) 
The two elites and the worker-population have different preferences over τ and Z, 
derived from the maximization of their utility. The desired tax rate for the “traditional” elite is 
obtained by maximizing the indirect utility with respect to τ. The first order condition is 
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-m+(1- C’(τ)) y = 0                                                                                                     (6) 
Under the assumptions that   m> y   , and C’(τ)≤1 ,  the optimal tax rate for the 
“traditional” elite is τ=0, as the LHS is always negative  (this is the same result as in 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a).  Furthermore, as financial reform affects negatively the 
“traditional” elite, through the increase in wage costs and through the overall negative effect 
on budget revenue, the optimal value of  Z for the “bad” elite is Z=0.                                                                                                    
The optimal tax rate for the “modern” elite is also zero, again because per capita 
income of the “modern” elite members is higher than the average per capita income. 
Regarding financial reform, the “modern” elite will obviously support it and thus its optimal 
value of Z is  Z= Z*. Moreover, the “modern” elite does not face a trade-off between income 
tax rate and financial development, as lack of financial development implies zero income for 
the “good” elite, irrespective of income taxes. 
Finally, we solve for the optimal tax rate and optimal financial reform for the worker-
population.  The optimal income tax rate desired by the population satisfies: 
((∂Vw)/(∂τ))=0:    -wm+(1-C’(τ)) y = 0                                                                         (7) 
Given that wm< y   then   τ>0. 
The population desires redistribution, given that its incomes are lower than those of 
the elites. The optimal choice of development of the financial sector is the same as for the 
“modern” elite, Z= Z*.  Thus, the worker-population demands redistribution and favours 
financial development.  
In democracy, the preference of the population will dominate and the outcome will 
thus be a positive tax rate and financial sector reform. By contrast, under partial democracy, 
the equilibrium reflects the preferences of one of the elites. We assume that the “traditional” 
elite will prevail because it possesses more resources to be spent in the process of controlling 
the government. This assumption implies that initially the level of financial development is 
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low, and thus the total amount of profits of the “modern” elite is low as well. Another way to 
look at the two elites is thinking in terms of incumbents and entrants. The “resource” sector 
can be seen as representing the incumbents, while the “manufacturing” sector new entrants.  
An additional assumption is that under partial democracy the government is weak and 
it is not able to counteract the pressure of the elite. In other words, the government is simply a 
“puppet”, executing the mandate of the “traditional” elite, and therefore under partial 
democracy Z=0.  
Under autocracy there are equilibria with financial reform. These equilibria arise for 
two main reasons. The first is the “consensus motive”, as the autocrat needs consensus to 
maintain its power. As the utility of the “modern” elite and of the worker-population enters its 
objective function, the autocrat has incentive to implement financial reform. The second is the 
“grabbing motive”, as financial reform may increase the tax base from which the autocrat 
derives its income (the effect through the appropriation component of the objective function). 
This effect depends on the net outcome of the increase in manufacturing output and the 
adverse effect on loss of revenue (C(Z)). Therefore, financial reform may help the autocratic 
government to maintain its power and protect its rent appropriation. 
Under autocracy, there are two possible sets of equilibria: one in which the 
government bases its power on the “traditional” elite, the other in which the base for the 
government power is due to a coalition of the “modern” elite and the population. Given our 
assumptions on the technology in the manufacturing sector, if the government gets support 
from the “traditional elite” (thus µ=1), Z=0 and output in the economy comes solely from the 
resource sector. Thus, the indirect utility of the government becomes: 
Va = Vb+βT                                                                                                                (5’) 
or 
Va = (1- τ)M/N b+(1 +β)[τ- C(τ)] y     
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And 
 y =( M/N b )( N b /N) 
where N is the total population.                                                                                                                                                                                                            
The tax rate that maximizes the above indirect utility is obtained from the following 
condition: 
-1+(1 +β)[1- C’(τ)] ( N b /N)=0 
If    (1 +β) ( N b /N)<1      then  τ=0,  otherwise  τ>0.  If the “grabbing hand” objective 
is high (high β), tax rates can be positive. However, considering that N b is a small proportion 
of total population, positive tax rates imply that β has to approach 1, an unlikely scenario. In 
the more likely scenario of zero tax rate, the government does not appropriate any resources, 
and at the same time faces high risks of loosing power, given the opposition of the large 
majority of the population. Thus, this equilibrium is consistent only with a situation in which 
the “traditional” elite captures the government. In other words, the political elite is powerless. 
The outcome in autocracy resembles the result obtained by Goshal and Proto (2008), who 
model the autocratic regime as one in which the government is supported by a coalition 
between one elite and the population.  
 The second set of equilibria implies financial reform. The “traditional” elite opposes 
such outcome and thus the consensus base is given by the “modern” elite and the worker-
population. Such situation corresponds to the case in which µ=0. 
The objective function of the government is: 
Va = Vg+ Vw+βT   
Or 
 Va=[(1-τ)(1-α)F(K,Lm)I(Z*)]/Ne2+[(1-τ)αF(K,Lm)I(Z*)(1+Lo)]/(Lm+Lo)+ 
(2+β)[τ-C(Z*)-C(τ)] y    
The condition for the optimal tax rate is: 
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      C’(τ)=1-[F(K,Lm)I(Z*)((1-α)/Ne2+α(1+Lo)/(Lm+Lo))]/[(2+β) y ]                                                                                                                             
The tax rate is always positive in this case. Thus, the government can appropriate 
resources and, at the same time, it has a broad support from one elite and the population. 
Financial reform is a key element for such consensus. If the government cares about 
consensus, the equilibrium supported by the coalition of the “modern” elite and the population 
dominates.  
In sum, the discussion so far has illustrated the fact that financial sector reform 
decreases during the shift from autocracy to partial democracy, whereas it increases with the 
shift from partial to full democracy. The model predicts a non-linear relationship between 
democracy and financial sector reform.  
